When I first read Andrew Hodge’s review of Dembski’s “The End of Christianity” in the Journal of Creation, I regarded Dembski’s views as being arcane speculation. I did not expect them to become present in everyday Christian discourse. But subsequently to reading the review, I found that they had!
A Christian worker of my acquaintance used an approach similar to Dembski’s to answer a question as to how there could be death before the Fall. This was done in a group discussion, but did not itself evoke much comment, unfortunately. It certainly didn’t bring discussion of the logical circle that Hodge sets out in the review, which ends with God being the author of evil.
And here, I think we see the basic theological problem of theistic evolution: not that it puts death before the fall, which it does, and which is obviously a problem, it being at first counter-scriptural then making the evidence of the dissolution of relationship between God and creature come to effect before the actual dissolution; but that it makes the action of evil inherent in the creation. Thus it makes to be evil part of what God has done out of his nature, and termed ‘very good’. This is simply incoherent. It makes God the author of ‘not-God’ and therefore by nature to include his own inversion. Interestingly Barth does this very thing in this statement in his commentary on Romans 8:21, 22 “All things...observed by men are hidden in God...good and evil” (Oxford edition, p. 309). It ends up more Zoroastrian than Christian, to my mind.
The notion has a number of other effects as well.
It seems to ignore that temporal order was created by God as part of the organising structure of experience within his creation. To upend this and have his creation show the dislocation of the fall prior to the fall makes nonsense of sequence, justice and causality. Indeed, if this had been part of orthodox theology, I doubt if science and reason would have taken root as the temporal anti-causality of Dembski’s theology would remove their basis in the created world (that which God has created as Real). Such an outworking would be reminiscent of the anti-temporality of some contemporary philosophical discussion that pops up in both critical theory particularly, and some flavours of post-modernism (refer, for instance to Fredric Jamison and Jean-Francois Lyotard’s glee at the displacement of history’s ‘grand narratives’ by post-modern language games, notwithstanding the irony of their inevitable reliance on strict temporality for actual communication).
Dembski seems to have also set out to rather glibly solve a problem that his commitment to naturalist chronology creates; but glibness here leads to another theological error. The results of the fall in death and dissolution are because relationship with God is broken. God steps back from his creation, as it were (signified in his having to seek Adam, and not know him in confraternity: loss of loving intimacy and life sustaining involvement has occurred) within the temporal framework of that creation. Adam, as the steward of the creation has rejected and ejected God from fellowship in his life by particular action at a particular time (notwithstanding the interpretation of Calvinism that has God in relationship trampling over his own creation of temporality, sequence and his image in man): the creation thus cut loose from the author and source of life must experience death and decay, frustration and failure.
To have the creation simultaneously be in fellowship with God and out of fellowship with God, which is what Dembski’s theodicy requires, has to be explained, not just presented by an off-hand and illogical assertion.
The final consequence is that Dembski’s ‘effect of the fall before the event of the fall’ theology is, as I’ve touched on above, destroys the temporal structure the Bible, gives to interaction patterns. It forces the adoption of a cyclical indeterminacy that turns its back on temporality, makes chronology meaningless and runs against biblical thought. This, if it truly did emerge with any real grounds from the Bible, would align Christian (and Jewish) theology with the types of pagan anti-temporal structures that Eliade discusses in “The Myth of Eternal Return”, and would undermine revelatory historicity with dire implications for the incarnation. In these terms, Dembski’s adoption of the concept of kairology is interesting as it makes time subjective (which is quite workable in many day to day ways: 'eat when hungry' is an example), but risks melding this into a pagan package of impersonal spiritualist subjectivity, countering the highly involved personal spiritual objectivity of the scriptures.
Finally, it is simple to rebut Dembski’s parallel between the sufficiency of Christ for redemption across history, and applying the fall contrary to causality irrespective of the flow of history. The first case is an act of will: God decides, a-temporally, that Christ’s work will have trans-temporal effect, because in fact it makes life triumph over death, and so must swallow up death (irrespective of what would end up to be transient temporal effects); but the second case is a matter of an event sequence within the creation where God has provided time as the mechanism of experiential structure, causal sequence and consequential moral responsibility or, to adopt a quip: “to stop everything happening at once”, which is precisely what Dembski wants to have happened!
