I wonder what ‘absolute’ truth is? Is it objective truth, that is independent of the subject, or could it be stated as something being true in all relationships at all times? So, in a way, true, independently of relationships. This could get a bit tricky, because truth is only apprehended in a relation, for example between an observer and a phenomenon in the external world.
But more is said better by Moreland in his address to the ETS in 2004.
One of the lines of development that underpins the post-modern approach to truth is, I think Berger and Luckmann’s book “The Social Construction of Knowledge” (1966). Where the case is made, with some merit, I think, that we jointly construct ‘reality’ in social contexts. However, this construction is limited and falls below the line of ‘truth’ in typical cases, and remains an operational matter, being about how relations are conceived and operated in complex social settings where a large set of shared assumptions about interactions and their meaning(s) apply. But, no matter how a group ‘constructs’ its world, they will leave rooms by doors and not walls. What is ‘constructed’ is the psycho-social meaning attached to leaving a room in the immediate context, I would think.
Towards the end of the talk, people were invited to join a prayer in turning to God; ironically, the invitation was made using the phrase “if it’s right for you” or words to that effect; which agrees with the post-modern project and tended to undo the argument being put forward in the talk (so if a Buddhist heard the talk, would they feel it was not ‘right for them’ and so not consider the prayer?). The irony of it!
The Bible, on the other hand, calls for repentance absolutely; there is no ‘right for you’ option. I’m not wanting to be critical here, as I’ve used this phrase myself, and it is probably a kind way of inviting people to consider their relationship with Christ…but, it also shows how popular thinking intrudes on our language (the way we socially construct reality) almost unnoticed.
In this context its interesting to consider a quote from Plantinga from his essay Naturalism Defeated
“But if naturalism is true, there is no God, and hence no God (or anyone else) overseeing our development and orchestrating the course of our evolution. And this leads directly to the question whether it is at all likely that our cognitive faculties, given naturalism and given their evolutionary origin, would have developed in such a way as to be reliable, to furnish us with mostly true beliefs. Darwin himself expressed this doubt: "With me," he said, the horrid doubt always arises whether the convictions of man's mind, which has been developed from the mind of the lower animals, are of any value or at all trustworthy. Would any one trust in the convictions of a monkey's mind, if there are any convictions in such a mind? The same thought is put more explicitly by Patricia Churchland. She insists that the most important thing about the human brain is that it has evolved; this means, she says, that its principal function is to enable the organism to move appropriately: Boiled down to essentials, a nervous system enables the organism to succeed in the four F's: feeding, fleeing, fighting and reproducing. The principle chore of nervous systems is to get the body parts where they should be in order that the organism may survive. . . . . Improvements in sensorimotor control confer an evolutionary advantage: a fancier style of representing is advantageous so long as it is geared to the organism's way of life and enhances the organism's chances of survival [Churchland's emphasis]. Truth, whatever that is, definitely takes the hindmost.”
Aside from the puzzle of Platinga's have-cake-and-eat-it belief (he seems to accept evolution, which is derived from naturalism, but criticises its naturalism in interesting contrast to Flew’s latter day rejection of naturalism), he throws up an interesting take on the concept, and indeed, the operation of truth in a naturalistic world, where minds only need to be sufficient for survival, and while Churchland’s view might not be held by all naturalists, it does suggest a weakness in naturalism’s conceptualisation of why things are as they are. If it’s not about survival, in some way (and that net may be quite large), then the connection with truth may be unsure.
Of course, at base, the post-modern explanation is self-defeating: if ‘truth’ is what you make it, then the truth of that view is itself subject to what one makes of it: here the post-modern project follows in the steps of its naturalist cousin and, in the great tradition of logical positivism, cannot provide the basis for its progam in terms of the program, and collapses on itself. On these grounds, the Christian is at liberty to reject it, while inviting post-moderns to leave by the wall, and not the door.
As an aside, during the talk I referred to above, a comment was made about moral positions that are held in all societies. Unfortunately, the examples given were not held in all societies. For instance, child abuse, asserted as being universally rejected, was in fact institutionalised in the ancient world over many centuries; in his book Sick Societies, Robert Edgerton documents many societies where practices that we would be appalled by are or were commonplace and applauded. Don Richardson in his book Peace Child takes us on a similar tour of depravity.
